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COMMENTS ON MAKI v. FRELK

Comment
Harry Kalven, Jr.*
My first reaction to the performance of the Illinois Appellate Court
in Maki v. Frelk was to recall the old joke about the man who, when
asked if he believed in baptism, replied: "Believe in it, hell, I've seen
it donel" In any event the decision provides a twin stimulus to the
commentator: first, to say something about the limits of common law
change, and second, to say something about comparative negligence
itself. Despite the spectacular novelty of the court's action, these remain well-worn topics on which it will not be easy to say anything
fresh. I am, however, moved by the occasion and the congenial
format of the short comment to talk informally on three or four
points. I should perhaps add as a final prefatory observation that,
although on various counts I have been uneasy about the daring of
the Illinois Appellate Court, I must admit to some feeling of letdown, of some loss of excitement and potentiality now that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court3 has brought a return to sanity.
At the very least it must be agreed that the Illinois Appellate Court
really made news!
I.
Let me begin then with the question of whether this was an appropriate change for a court to make. It is, I think, evident that we
do not have any agreed upon theory on the limits of the powers of
common law courts. In recent decades the American legal community
has been so fascinated with the performance of the Supreme Court
of the United States that it has spent much of its energies brooding
over the limits of judicial activism at the constitutional level. It
might well be that the Warren Court would not look so controversial
to some, were more attention paid to the rate of change that has
become common among common law courts these days.
The first thing to note is that the change came as a surprise. It was
not predictable to the close student as was perhaps MacPherson P.
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. A.B. 1935; J.D. 1938,
University of Chicago. Co-editor of GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES AND MATEMALS ON
TORTS (1959).
1. 85 Ill.
App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).
2. In a sense I speak as an eye witness. The appeal in Maki to the Illinois Supreme
Court was argued in the Kirkland court room at the University of Chicago, and I was
thus able to attend it, along with the entire first year class.
3. Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
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Buick Motor Co.,4 or to take more recent examples, Gideon v. Wain-

right,5 Wycko v. Gnodtke,6 or the products liability cases.7 Thus,
Fleming James, writing back in 1938 about last clear chance as a
"transitional doctrine," 8 did not argue that it was a common law
adjustment of the contributory negligence rule that would by gradual
evolution grow into comparative negligence. His point was rather
that, logically, last clear chance performed many of the functions of
comparative negligence, performed them crudely and that "these difficulties would all be swept away by a statutory adoption of the
principle of proportional fault."9 And the last words on the matter
from Dean Prosser in 1964 read as follows:

There never has been any essential reason why the change could not be
made without a statute, but it is so sweeping an alteration of the law,
affecting so many thousands of cases, that there has been understandable
reluctance on the part of the courts to take such a step; and there appears
to be very little likelihood that they will do so, at least until legislation
becomes much more common and unopposed than it is.1°
Finally, there is the case of Professor Keeton, who not only dealt
directly with the problem in his striking essay on growth in the
common law process in torts," but actually went on to draft the

opinion for a court disposed to make the change-a gesture of help
which ironically the Illinois courts and lawyers did not seem to be
aware of. Even his case, as I read it, is not evidence to the contrary.
Professor Keeton was not predicting; he was taking what he must
have regarded as the hardest case for his thesis and arguing that even

there one could write a satisfactory opinion.
There is also the fact that the difficulties and weaknesses of the
common law rule as to contributory negligence had been fully disclosed and argued out for generations. There was no technological
or sociological change that made the doctrine now look different than
it had in prior years-as there has been, for example, in the problem
of measuring damages for the death of a young child. 12 In brief,
nothing was producing any new insight about the rule nor was
there any new reason for changing it that had not been fully
4. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
7. See, e.g., Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YAxE L.J. 1099 (1960).
8. James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 705 (1938).
9. Id. at 722.
10. W. Pnossmi, ToTs 445 (3d ed. 1964).
11. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 H~Mv. L. Rriv. 463 (1962).
12. See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Note, Damages
for the Wrongful Death of Children, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 538 (1955).
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evident to all those courts which for all those years had refused to
make the change. Moreover, as the quotation from Dean Prosser
suggests, there is the stubborn fact of the legislative response. The
Federal Employers Liability Act had offered a model of the comparative negligence formula since 1908; Mississippi has had a statute
since 1910; the well-known Wisconsin statute was adopted back in
1931. In brief, although statutory models have been visible for a long
time, there has been notably little legislative momentum. In recent
decades only Arkansas has acted, and its example dating from 1956
has not moved any other state legislatures to follow suit. 13 Further,
bills have been introduced without success in many state legislatures.
We have then a situation in which legislation is possible, and has
indeed been tried, but in which there is clearly no legislative consensus
14
in favor of the reform.
It is often urged that a court ought to be able to undo any rule of
law which is purely judge-made in origin. There is, however, a distinctive, logical quality about the contributory negligence rule that complicates the application of this principle. There is an analogy here to
the problem Professor Paul Freund noted in his recent discussion of
the Court's hesitancy to overrule the Civil Rights Cases.' 5 It was,
thought Professor Freund, not immediately clear what principle would
be put in their place by the overruling-it could scarcely be that all
private action is now state action. Similarly with the contributory
negligence rule. To overrule it is not by that act alone to put something in its place.'6 There are a basic variety of comparative negligence formulae, and the court rejecting the old rule must select one
full-blown alternative to put in its place. It is not just a matter of say13. See Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After"
Survey, 13 Anu. L. REv. 89 (1959).

14. It should perhaps be added that while there has been considerable comparative
negligence legislation in the United States to cover limited and specialized types of
accidents, there is a lack of legislation for comparative negligence of general application.
See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALin. L. REV. 1 (1953). And we should
add the puzzling fact that the United States alone has been cool toward such legislation;
the United States apart, there is an apparently worldwide consensus in favor of
comparative negligence. See Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Cm.Kzr L. REv. 189 (1950).
15. P. FrXuND, ON LAw AND JusTcE 16 (1968).
16. Compare the discussion by Justice Schaefer of the companion problem of con-

tribution among joint tortfeasors: "In a few jurisdictions the problem has been met by
provisions requiring contribution among joint tortfeasors.

So far as I am aware, that

change in the law has always been accomplished by statute. The reason, I think, is
that the problem is not self-contained. It cannot be satisfactorily solved by judicial
announcements of a rule requiring contribution among joint tortfeasors.

To operate

satisfactorily a system of comparative negligence would be necessary with resulting
complications as to jury verdicts." Scmayx'z,
PpxcEDNT AND PoUcy 10-11 (1955).
But cf. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463, 477

n.32 (1962).
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ing yes where we had previously said no. Given the incidence of
modem tort law, the court cannot abolish the old rule and evolve
slowly over time a solution to the problem of the victim's negligence.
Perhaps it is this aspect which accounts for the oddity of the appellate court in Maki literally adopting someone else's statute, as it
did with Wisconsin's.' 7 This would seem to go a good way beyond
the oft-noted possibility of a court reasoning by analogy from a
statute. 18

Finally, there is the question of whether, if a common law court
were to take this step, an Illinois court was the appropriate one. Much
has been made of Illinois' prior flirtation with common law comparative negligence in the Galena case, 19 as though it gave Illinois
an hereditary claim to make the change. However, its old common
law rule was not an application of comparative negligence, but rather
involved a shifting of the total loss from one party to another. And
in any event it had been abandoned in Illinois in 1894.2° More to the
point, I would suggest, are two distinctive Illinois rules which place
Illinois in an extreme minority of states vis-A-vis contributory negligence. The first is the rule which places the burden of proof of no
contributory negligence on the plaintiff; 21 the second is the rule rejecting any variant of last clear chance.22 One could well argue that
prior Illinois law had shown a distinctive lack of sympathy for the
negligent plaintiff.
Having exploited these points of doubt, I must confess that the
issue leaves me highly perplexed. As Professor James has taught us,
surely last clear chance is an adjustment of the contributory negligence rule-a partial repeal of it. And whatever we may think of its
gothic details as doctrine, the proliferation of it is common law process
in its purest form. Why, if a court can erode the common law rule
by this route, it is inappropriate for it to do it by a more direct

and more rational route?
II.

Part of the case for judicial action with respect to the contributory
negligence rule is that the comparative rule is far better on the merits.
17. The court even "adopted" the Wisconsin special verdict procedure.
18. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HAnVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213
(1934).
19. Galena & Chicago Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill.
478 (1858). Judge Moran
carefully reviews the Illinois precedents under the Galena rule in Maid v. Frelk, 85
Ill. App. 2d 439, 442-45, 229 N.E.2d 284, 286-88 (1967).
20. City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill.
163, 38 N.E. 892 (1894).
21. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions § 201 (1961).
22. See Carson, Piie, Scott & Co. v. Chicago Ry., 309 II. 346, 141 N.E. 172
(1923). It has been suggested, however, that Illinois, despite its disavowal, applies a
disguised version; see W. PRossim, ToRTs 439 (3d ed. 1964).
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I am aware that this is the consensus among able and distinguished
students. Nevertheless it may not be amiss to bring back into the
discussion certain familiar difficulties. First, there is the illusory precision. In general, commentators have been critical of the concept
of degrees of negligence, but in this one instance it is greeted enthusiastically. The point is not whether exactitude is possible here, which
assuredly it is not, but rather whether the very idea of comparison is
intelligible-when both parties on hypothesis have been negligent and
the negligence has been causal. Whatever the difficulties are thought
to be with the fault concept in general, surely great strains are put on
it under comparative negligence. Can the human mind honestly
aspire to do more in these matters than split the loss between the
parties? Second, one consequence of the common law rule seems
not to have been sufficiently appreciated, namely, that the defendant
is also barred by his negligence from collecting from the plaintiff.
The rule works with a rough equity of letting losses lie where they
fall in cases where both parties are negligent and both are injured.
Indeed one wonders whether the argument on the merits of comparative negligence has not been worked out with a single stereotype
in mind-the ten per cent negligent plaintiff who is badly injured by
the ninety percent negligent defendant who suffers no injury. As we
move away from this case, familiar problems arise. Is it fair to
permit the dominantly negligent plaintiff to recover, or should we
follow the Wisconsin strategy and provide a cut-off? And if we use
a cut-off can we avoid arbitrary discriminations as we get close to the
50-50 point? Moreover, where both parties are injured, is it fair to let
damages go "up stream," that is, from the less negligent to the more
negligent? Finally, if we use the "pure" form, in cases where there
is damage on both sides, will not the discounts tend to cancel and
offset each other so as to trivialize what we are accomplishing? These
are all points which trouble the average law class and on which, it is
my experience as a teacher, there is no easy consensus. In sum, I
think insufficient attention has been paid in rationalizing comparative
negligence to the situation which the auto accident has made commonplace-negligence and damage on both sides.
III.
Another wing of the argument for judicial change here is that the
court is simply legitimating a change the jury had already made.
In, for example, Professor Keeton's argument for the change the jury
loomed large. He urged that the duplicity of instructing juries under
the contributory negligence rule knowing they would not follow it
was "deplorable." He urged also that jury revolt against the rule was
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strong evidence that the rule was contrary to "the prevailing sense
of justice of laymen." From my special vantage point perhaps the
most interesting aspect of the Maki phenomenon is this argument,
based on an asserted factual premise about how juries behave.23 It is
a prime example of what might be called the myth-making propensities of legal realism, or better, perhaps the sentimentality of realism.
Whether or not juries do in fact act this way seems not to have
touched anyone's curiosity. There has been a kind of universal "judicial notice" taken. How, we might wonder, does the argument for
judicial intervention look if the premise about jury behavior is not
so secure?
At this juncture I should like to summarize the impressions we
have garnered from our studies of the jury. Due to the vicissitudes
that seem to attach to large-scale, long-term research projects, our
materials on the civil jury have not yet been reported out systematically. This is unfortunate because the data is somewhat complex
and needs to be seen in full. To reduce the conclusions to a sentence
or two: the data show that the jury is highly ambivalent in its response to the negligence of the victim. The popular view of the
jury's de facto repeal of the common law rule is a half-truth at best;
the jury sometimes acts in stringent support of the rule. In sum, it is
doubtful that anyone would seek to mount an argument for reform of
the common law rule on contributory negligence based on our impressions of the jury's behavior toward the rule.
We have two lines of data. The first comes from the technique of
comparing judge and jury verdicts for the same case. It is the method
devised by my colleague Hans Zeisel, and used in The American
Jury,24 and it offers the judge as a baseline against which to measure
the jury performance. What then can we say about how differently
from the judge the jury responds when the case involves contributory
negligence? According to our data: (1) In cases where contributory
negligence is an issue, judge and jury still agree roughly 80 percent
of the time. (2) In the large, the upper limit of disagreement between
judge and jury because of jury leniency toward contributory negligence is ten percent, since this is roughly the percentage of cases in
which contributory negligence is an issue where the jury finds for the
plaintiff when the judge would not. (3) And more important perhaps for present purposes, in such cases another ten percent of the
disagreements are occasioned by the reverse phenomenon-the judge
deciding in favor of the plaintiff where the jury would not. (4) Further,
23. It should be noted that the Maid-court itself does not rest its case on jury
behavior toward contributory negligence.
24. H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsE.L, THE A. mucAN JuRy, cbs. 4, 7 (1966).
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if we compare the patterns of judge-jury disagreement in cases where
contributory negligence is an issue to cases where it is not an issue,
we find no significant differences. (5) Moreover when we look at
disagreements over damages, we find an appreciable number of cases
where the jury gives a lower award, suggesting that the jury was
discounting for contributory negligence even though the judge would
have given the plaintiff a full award. (6) When we look in the individual case at the reasons the judge offers for disagreements, we find
the judge only with relative infrequency assigning the jury revolt
against the common law rule as the reason. And we have a roughly
equal number of cases where the disagreement is in the other direction where the judge's explanation runs in terms of jury stringency
toward negligent victims. (7) Finally, if we look directly at the
verdicts of the jury alone without using the judge as a baseline,
we see that in 46 percent of the cases where contributory negligence
was an issue the jury decided for the defendant. In cases where there
is no contributory negligence issue, this figure falls to 22 percent.
Moreover, as we group the cases by the strength of the proof of contributory negligence, we find the jury verdicts moving with the evidence: as we go from slight proof to close cases to considerable proof,
the percentage of jury verdicts for the defendant moves from 34 percent to 45 percent to 69 percent.
The second line of data comes from the use of the. experimental
jury technique.2 5 At one point in the project we ran an experiment
in which a key variable was the instruction on victim's negligence.
Half the juries were instructed under the common law rule and half
under the "pure" form of comparative negligence. Two other details
of the design need to be noted. We were able to vary the injuries
from one party to the other so that in half the cases the dominantly
negligent party was injured, and in the other half the less negligent
party was the injured plaintiff. Finally, we had obtained from a prior
set of jury experiments which did not involve any contributory negligence a jury "price" for this set of injuries.2
In briefest compass these were the relevant results: (1) In cases
where the common law instruction was used, the plaintiff nevertheless won verdicts 40 percent of the time. (2) There was a marked
difference turning on how negligent the plaintiff was. When he was
the less negligent party, he recovered in 58 percent of the cases, but
when he was the dominantly negligent party he recovered in only 22
percent of the cases. (3) Finally as to damages, the "jury price" for
25. The method was developed by Professor Fred Strodtbeck and is exemplified in
R. SaroN, THx JuRy AND

=

DEFErsE oF INSANrrY (1967).

26. That is, we were able to borrow the damage facts from a prior experiment and
give exactly the same injuries and the same medical evidence to the plaintiff here.
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the injuries had been set by the prior experiment at $40,000. The
average jury verdicts for the cases under the common law instruction
where the jury nevertheless found for the plaintiff was $30,000; however, the average verdict for the same injuries when the jury was
instructed under comparative negligence dropped to $20,000.
The impression left by these data is complex. To some degree
they do support the popular impression. But they also show that
reports of the jury revolt against the common law rule are much like
the reports of Mark Twain's death, and that the jury behavior is a
slendor reed on which to rest the case for reform of the rule.
IV.
To convey a final set of reactions to the Maki case, let me shift
attention for a moment to matters of strict liability. We have been
told that the victim's negligence was a relevant fact under a fault
system and that the error of the common law approach was to have
made it decisive.-" The question is whether under proposals for strict
liability the victim's fault remains in any sense relevant.
A small point first. It appears logically very difficult, if not impossible, to attempt to use comparative negligence adjustments when
we are dealing with strict liability. As a matter of wording, none of
the current statutes would appear to allow for this. And as a matter
of theory it is not apparent how they could be rewritten for the
purpose.
How do matters stand if we move now to auto compensation plans?
The usual response, as for example under the Keeton-O'Connell plan,
has been to disregard fault on both sides. And in the Keeton-O'Connell
plan the logic has been carried to the point of including within the
coverage the single-car accident.
For the moment, what is of interest is whether, when we confront
the matter head-on, we are willing to treat as altogether irrelevant
the contribution of the victim to his own accident. At times, critics
of the fault system appear to have found some place for victim fault.
Some years ago Professor Ehrenzweig in his original and important
proposal of a plan of "full-aid" insurance28 devised a system of fines to
be levied against the contributorily negligent. He observed on behalf
of his proposal:
Safety would finally be promoted by allowing tort fine recovery not only
against the criminally negligent injurer, but also against the criminally

negligent victim. At present, even an ordinarily negligent victim is automatically deprived of his entire claim, although this penalty may be
27. James, ContributorjNegligence, 62 YA..x L.J. 691 (1953).
28. A. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VIc'Im (1954).
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entirely out of proportion with the degree of his fault and the consequences
of this sanction. Having eliminated the obsolete and generally rejected
defense of contributory negligence, its policy could be more effectively
served by the tort fine which again could more properly be adjusted to
degrees of fault and financial circumstances. 29

And recently Professor Marc Franklin after noting that "recovery
by very careless victims has posed a psychological obstacle to all plans
since the Columbia Report," put forward his own proposal of a plan
to replace "the negligence lottery." ° In deference to the community
sense of justice, he would:
provide that the eighty-five per cent lost income payment be further reduced but to not less than seventy-five per cent for the victim whose
"serious misconduct" contributed to his injury. To permit the recovery of
seventy-five per cent would still leave the victim reasonably well protected.
Though one may feel sympathy for the innocent family of the careless victim,
if some deterrence is thought necessary the diminution seems appropriate. 31

In the comments of Professors Ehrenzweig and Franklin, one can
detect the outlines of a development in the law from contributory
negligence as a 100 percent defense, to comparative negligence, to
something beyond comparative negligence. The ultimate resting place
of the law's concern with victim fault is, thus, not easy to predict
at the moment.
This would be an appropriate remark with which to close these
reflections, but a final query presses, and I add it as a postscript.
What is likely to be the role of comparative negligence with respect to
the momentum toward automobile compensation plans? Is it likely
to slow the momentum or accelerate it? On the one hand, if coupled
with compulsory liability insurance it may enable the common law
to go a long step toward meeting the social objectives of the proponents of plans by vastly increasing coverage. And this might appear to be the best strategy for a bar and insurance industry committed to keeping the common law. On the other hand, it may be
just the modest change which then makes the larger change irresistible. It would be hard to think of a more expensive and diseconomical
insurable event than the measuring of proportional fault.
In Maki the Illinois Appellate Court, as said at the outset, really
made news. And although its daring has been curbed by the decision
of the Illinois Supreme Court, the very fact of its decision has altered
permanently the subtle equilibrium of forces which sets the pace of
common law change.
29. Id. at 33-34.
30. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA.L. Rlv. 774, 789 (1967).
31. Id. at 801.

